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The aim of the present paper is to assess the degree of central bank legal independence enjoyed by the 
central banks of the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea, which belong to the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and to shed some light on the macroeconomic outcomes of different degrees of 
independence. To this end a methodology used by the International Monetary Fund, here slightly 
modified to better suit the characteristics of the central banks in the area, is introduced and applied. 
The main findings of the present work are as follows: i) as regards legal independence, the 
Mediterranean countries show a diverse picture, sometimes far from the common wisdom; ii) legal 
independence does not always appear in line with the de facto situation; iii) Cyprus and Malta (that 
recently joined the European Union), as well as Turkey, that has been recognized a candidate country 
status, do not always show the best degrees of legal/actual independence and iv) many central banks of 
the area have recently amended their Statutes with a view to achieving more independence, as the 
issue has a key role in the modernization of the economies and a priority status in the implementation 
of a comprehensive and effective set of political and economic reforms. 
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Introduction
* 
Central bank independence has been a widely explored field of research for industrialized countries 
since the seminal work of Alesina (1988). During the first half of the 1990s other prominent works 
(see paragraph 1) contributed to better qualify the concept of independence in the aim to provide an 
adequate taxonomy of the phenomenon and to explore the alleged relation between central bank 
independence and macroeconomic performance.  
Nonetheless, not surprisingly, the analysis of the state of the art of central bank independence has 
been not extensive for developing and emerging economies, since recent years. Two recent 
contributions of the IMF propose a simplified methodology to assess the de jure independence in some 
developing regions. As far as today, an assessment of the degree of legal independence for the central 
banks of the countries of the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea does not exist in the literature.  
To limit the analysis to the de jure independence presents both advantages and shortcomings. The 
first, rather obvious, advantage, is that one has to base the evaluation only on legal documents, without 
considering any political or institutional arrangement (usually informal and complex) or any actual 
procedure or practice not clearly set by the law. In other words, one can be factual and limit the 
informative set to few and easily available notices. Another advantage is that one can consider only 
well established and legally enforced rules, that are likely to prevail against informal procedures in 
case of serious conflicts between different institutional bodies.  
Moreover, what the law states is likely to became actual, even if not fully yet implemented, once 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms are set up. In a way, the examination of the central bank law, to 
the extent in which the local authorities are committed to their fulfilment, can help to determine the 
perspective status of central bank independence. 
On the other hand, there may also be the case, as for instance for Israel in the Mediterranean 
region, in which established practice can give guidance for legislative authorities in preparing future 
laws. However, this is probably an exception which it is not likely to happen in transition economies.    
Obviously, there is also an evident disadvantage in considering only the central bank charters: it 
does not allow catching the current status of independence and this may result in a misperception of 
the actual framework in which monetary policy is currently conducted. It is also true that any 
consolidated informal institutional agreement is likely to become, sooner or later, a law, when 
politically and institutionally validated (with a possible temporal delay that depends on the 
institutional framework). All in all, the legal approach should be considered a suitable one. 
The aim of the present paper is to assess the degree of central bank de jure independence enjoyed 
by the central banks of the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea, which belong to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership
1 and to shed some light on the macroeconomic outcome of different 
degrees of independence. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: paragraph 1 briefly 
reviews the literature on central bank independence, paragraph 2 describes the approach followed by 
this study, paragraph 3 shows the results, paragraph 4 shed some light on the macroeconomic impact 
of central bank independence in the region and paragraph 5 concludes. 
                                                      
*   The author wish to thank the participants of the Eighth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, organised 
by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and held in Montecatini Terme on 21-25 March 2007, for the useful 
comments and stimulating discussion. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1   Though Libya has only an observer status. The analysis excludes Syria, because the relative central  bank law 
was not available. Enrico Gisolo 
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1. A Brief Survey of the Literature on Central Bank Independence 
A comprehensive review of the large body of literature on central bank independence is beyond the 
aim of the present work. It is anyway worth noting here that several empirical studies of industrialized 
economies provide evidence that increased central bank autonomy is positively correlated with lower 
average inflation (see, for example, Grilli et al. 1991, or Cukierman 1992 ). Since 1970, during the 
post Bretton Woods period, the industrialized countries, which accorded greater legal autonomy to 
their central banks, also experienced lower average inflation, while this seem not to have affected 
negatively average real growth. However, the correlation between legal autonomy and lower inflation 
did not appear, at least until the end of the ‘90s, to be empirically significant in developing countries. 
Nonetheless, some more recent studies have introduced new variables in the empirical studies and the 
results have not always been so clear-cut (see, for example, Campillo & Miron 1997, or De Haan & 
Koi 2000). For a brief but complete survey of studies regarding industrialized countries, also 
interesting for the homogeneous comparison of different indicators and for the innovative multivariate 
methodology presented by the authors, see de Haan et al. (2002). For a more comprehensive review of 
the literature, with some insight also on developing countries, see Gutiérrez (2003).  
The remainder of this section will deal with some recent works focused on emerging markets 
economies. Lybek (1999) initially set the stage for an indicator of central bank de jure independence 
suitable for emerging economies. His study deals with countries of the former Soviet Union in the 
period 1995-1997. As regards the index used, it embodies most of the elements found in other similar 
indexes, but, in addition, it is specifically tailored to suit the guidelines followed by the Monetary and 
Exchange Affairs Department and the Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund when 
they provide technical assistance. 
Gutiérrez (2003) argues that the alleged lack of correlation between legal central bank 
independence and inflation in emerging economies may depend on the lower level of enforcement of 
the law in these countries with respect to industrialized ones and, thus, considers only the provisions 
embodied in the legal documents of the highest rank (Constitutions), finding evidence of the fact that 
those countries in Latin American and the Caribbean that entrench the independence of central bank in 
their constitutional charters exhibit a better inflation performance. The index of legal independence 
employed is basically the same as in Lybek (1999), with slight modification in the evaluation score scales.  
Dvorsky (2000) measures the degree of legal and actual central bank independence in five Central 
and Eastern European transition economies (namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) using the Cuckierman (1992) and the Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) indices 
for legal independence and the turn over rate of central bank governors to proxy the degree of actual 
central bank independence. The main conclusion of the paper is that, together with central bank 
independence, other requirements were needed (as structural reforms and a proper coordination of 
fiscal and monetary policies) to effectively fight inflation in those countries, join the European Union 
and, in a more distant future, adopt the euro as a currency. 
De Haan and Sturm (2001) analyze whether central bank independence affects inflation in an 
extensive set of developing countries, based on the central bank turnover rate of the governors and 
extending their study to the 1990s. They find that, in general, central bank independence does not 
appear significant in explaining inflation when controlling for a various inflation-related variables, 
apart from the case of very high-inflation countries. 
Beblavy (2003) uses a different approach to central bank independence, presenting the result of a 
questionnaire survey proposed personally by the author to the deputy governors of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia to assess which were, according to the profession, amongst 
the various criteria proposed by the literature, the ones on which central bank independence should 
most properly rely. As a control sample the author uses the analogous information provided for 
industrialized countries by the literature (see Masciandaro e Spinelli, 1994). The main results are that 
central bankers from both groups agree strongly on the importance of two aspects of central bank The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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independence: goal independence and freedom to implement these goals (together with the freedom to 
determine terms and limit of the eventual credit granted to the government).     
2. The Methodology and Brief Regional Overview 
2.1. The methodology 
The methodology followed in the present work is derived from Gutiérrez (2003), who heavily drew on 
the simplified approach to assess central bank independence in emerging market economies originally 
proposed by Lybek (1999). According to this method, only the legal situation is taken into account, 
without any consideration of the general monetary policy framework as determined by (informal) 
agreements and common practices. 
The methodology evaluates central bank independence along five dimensions: Central bank 
objectives,  Policy formulation,  Political autonomy,  Economic autonomy and Accountability. Each 
dimension presents a different number of sub-dimensions (i.e.: two in the case of Central bank 
objectives and Accountability, four in the case of Policy formulation and Economic autonomy, seven 
in the case of Political autonomy). Each sub-dimension presents an evaluation scale of three to five 
degrees to each of which a score ranging from -1 (higher degree of dependence) to 1 (higher degree of 
independence) is associated. Aggregation of scores by dimension is made summing up partial scores.  
As referred before, there are two possible versions of the IMF methodology, one as in Lybek 
(1999), the other one as in Gutiérrez (2003). Basically the two methodologies coincide, apart from the 
scale of the scores. The second one appears to be more suitable since it allows for negative evaluations 
on single aspects of independence, and thus seems to present a higher discriminatory power.  
Some slight modifications of the Gutiérrez analysis benchmarks have been necessary to suit the 
methodology to the Mediterranean countries. These modifications have been kept to a minimum, in 
order to preserve the comparability of the results of the present analysis with other studies. A 
comprehensive description of the revisited methodology is reported in Appendix 1. It is worth noting 
that the present study does not consider, as Gutierrez (2003) does, the constitutions, as the practice of 
embodying central bank provisions in constitutions is not present in the Mediterranean region. Instead, 
ordinary laws have been considered. Obviously, the fact that the independence of the central banks of 
the region considered in the present study is enshrined in a law or even a decree and not in the 
constitution does not safeguard these provisions to the same extent from frequent legislative reforms. 
In order to reduce the analyst-sensitivity of the results, the evaluation of legal independence along the 
criteria for each country has been sometimes re-scaled by subtracting from it the relative average 
value. In these cases (all except the Total results in fig. 1 and 2, which are absolute values) the results 
should be intended on a comparative basis instead of on an absolute one.  
As any other index to measure independence, the one used in the present study can be considered 
subjective. Indeed, Mangano (1998) claimed that an important “subjectivity” bias, deriving from an 
interpretation bias, existed when comparing the results of the most commonly used indicators (those of 
Grilli, Masciandaro & Tabellini (1991), and Cukierman (1992)). Actually, the assertion of subjectivity 
when building an index is definitely difficult to reject. 
The legal basis that have been used, that reflect the major legal developments in the area, are 
summarized in Table 1. Enrico Gisolo 
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Table 1 - Legal central bank provisions in the Barcelona process countries 
 
2.2. Brief Regional Overview 
Some Mediterranean countries have experienced in recent years, or are still going through, legal 
developments in central bank laws. Generally these developments have led to an improvement of the 
de jure independence. In some cases (Malta, Cyprus and Turkey) the reforms were related to the EU 
accession process. In some others, they can be seen in the wider framework of a move towards 
structural reform and financial system liberalization and modernization. Morocco is likely to adopt 
soon a new legislation on central banking activity that has been largely announced but on which the 
authors still lack details, even if the general outlook of the new law can be considered officially 
acquired. Egypt has very recently modified the statute of the central bank. A relevant exception in this 
move towards greater independence regards Algeria, where the legal framework has changed (2001 and 
2003), enhancing to some extent the influence of the government on the activities of the central bank. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there are several features of the Mediterranean region, some 
common to the region as a whole, and some others specific to a country, that may be useful to better 
understand the results of the study. The diversity within the region is important, since this set of 
countries brings together the Maghreb-Masrhek ones with Israel, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, which 
feature different characteristics. 
1.  The recent economic history of the Maghreb-Masrek countries, for example, influences 
undoubtedly the degree of independence of its central banks; most of the countries in the region 
had adopted centrally-directed economic models, in which the official sector had a very 
Country CENTRAL BANKS LAWS
Algeria Ordonnnance relative a la Monnaie et au Crédit,  n° 03-11,  26 august 2003
Cyprus The Central Bank of Cyprus Law of 2002 (N. 138(I) 2002) 
Egypt
Presidential Decree No. 64 of the Year 2004 Promulgating the Statute of the Central Bank of Egypt, based on 
Law of the Central Bank, the Banking Sector and Money, promulgated by Law No. 88 of 2003
Israel  Bank of Israel Law, 5714-1954, effective from December 1954
Jordan
Law No. 23 of 1971, Law of the Central Bank of Jordan, as amended by Laws No. 37 of 1989, 14 of 1991, No. 
10 of 1992, No. 16 of 1992
Lebanon Code of Money and Credit, promulgated by Legislative Decree N° 13513 of August 1, 1963
Libya Law No. 8 of 1425(M) */ 1996  and Law No. (1) of 1993 Concerning the Banking, Currency & Credit
Malta 
Central Bank of Malta Act, Chapter 204, Act XXXI of 1967, as amended by Acts: X and XXIX of 1968, XVII and 
XX of 1971, XXIV of 1972, XIX and LVIII of 1974; Legal Notice 148 of 1975; and Acts: XX of 1981, XIII of 
1983, XXXVIII of 1986, XI of 1988, XIV and XXVI of 1994, XXIV of 1995, IX and XVI of 1997, XVIIof 2002 and 
III of 2004.
Morocco
Statues of Bank Al-Maghrib, Dahir N° 1.59.233 du 23 hija 1378 (30 juin 1959). Also Dahir bearing law N° 1-93-
147 of July 6th, 1993 relating to the activity of Credit Institutions and their control.
Palestinean 
Authority
Law of 16th. December, 1997
Tunisia Law N° 58-90, 19 September 1958 establishing the Central Bank of Tunisia 
Turkey
Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, No. 1211, Date of Acceptance: January 14, 1970, as 
amended by Law No. 4651 of April 25, 2001The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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important participation in the economy. Therefore, a transition towards a market-oriented and 
private-sector led economy has been undertaken –and it is still in process-  in the past years, 
with structural reforms being pursued - deregulation, liberalization, promotion of competition 
etc.  Specifically concerning the financial sector, reforms have aimed at increasing central bank 
independence, privatization, liberalization in interest rates, etc.  Thus, the move towards central 
bank independence has to be framed in this context, in which the private sector is starting to 
retrench itself from heavy interferences from the public sector, but the process is still ongoing.  
2.  The accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 contributed undoubtedly to the 
modification of their Central Bank laws to achieve more independence. Indeed, during the 
convergence process both the ECB and the European Commission have guided these countries 
towards the modification of their statutes to achieve full compliance with those of the ECB. 
The same applies, though under a different process since the accession procedure is not so 
advanced, to the case of Turkey.    
3.  Israel is probably the only country that cannot be classified into any of the above mentioned 
blocks. As a developed country, its Central Bank would be expected to be very independent, 
though this is not the case in legal terms. 
4.  At the same time, exchange rate regimes also matter; if central banks are really independent but 
the country has an open capital account and a fixed exchange regime, in practice it would be 
very difficult for the central bank to actively pursue its main objectives independently (i.e. the 
so-called “impossible trinity”). Furthermore, with a currency board, for example, there is not 
much room for a national independent monetary policy. Thus, we have reviewed the exchange 
rate regimes of the region, and made sure that there are no such cases in the region. Some 
countries in the region have evolved towards a more flexible exchange rate, in line with 
developments in a wide range of other countries. The exchange rate regime of the countries 
considered (excluding Malta and Cyprus due to their accession status and Palestine
2) is as follows: 
-  Soft pegs: Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco;  
-  Exchange rate bands: Israel (free floating de facto: exchange rate band 
around 50%); 
-  Managed floating exchange rates: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt (though officially 
classified  as floating); 
-  Independently floating exchange rate: Turkey. 
The following section examines the results in the light of the above mentioned peculiarities.  
3. Results 
The preliminary application of the methodology to the 12 Mediterranean countries considered 
(excluding Syria and including Libya), led to the results exposed in Appendix 1 and graphically 
displayed in fig.1. The ranking of countries is determined by their degree of independence. 
While some of the results are intuitively understandable, other ones are probably different from 
what one could figure out on the basis of experiences and expectations, a difference which may also 
reflect the fact that de facto independence is sometimes far away from what merely legal consideration 
would imply. A notable example of this is the case of Israel in which the de facto independence is 
                                                      
2   Palestine is a rather peculiar case as it currently lacks a national currency: in the status quo three different 
currencies are used: the new Israeli shekel, the Jordanian dinar (used more in the West Bank than in Gaza) 
and the US dollar, with the former being used for most transaction, especially retail ones, and the latter two 
used mostly for saving deposits and for same durable good transactions. Against this background, the more 
likely development seem to be the creation of a new Palestinian currency anchored, either under a currency 
board or under a fixed but adjustable parity, to the shekel, the dinar and the dollar and/or the euro. Enrico Gisolo 
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much greater than the de jure independence, which is just the opposite of the case of the Palestine 
Monetary Authority, whose de jure independence is much greater than the factual one – except for the 
political autonomy criteria – mainly due to the delicate socio-political situation and to the fact that 
Palestine does not issue its own currency. 
According to the figures, the new EU member States, Cyprus and Malta, rank among the first 
places. Tunisia also seems to have a very independent law, while the case of Algeria is an anomaly 
that derives from the use of the methodology, as explained below. Morocco ranks in the last position, 
which explains why it is in the process of modifying its central bank law to make the Bank Al-
Maghrib more independent. As for the second worst result, Jordan, this is due mainly to the strong 
governmental involvement in the appointment and dismissal of the governor and members of the Board. 
Apart from considerations on the measured level of independence, the graph also displays an 
important characteristic of any law: its internal coherence. In fact, a given level of independence might 
be less effective when some highly positive components face some other significantly negative ones 
compared to the case in which all the components are coherently positive. With this respect the case of 
Algeria shows, perhaps surprisingly, a good example of a coherently balanced law, despite the recent 
modification aimed to reduce the independence of the central bank and the methodological caveats 
that will be put forward below.  
As the Gutierrez methodology does not coincide with the one used by the Eurosystem to assess the 
compliance with the Treaty, we also propose a weighted version of the index, in which the weights for 
the criteria have been assigned, according to the importance given to them in the compliance 
assessment
3 pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) with respect to accession countries. The 
results are shown in fig. 2. 
Fig. 1 – Assessment of Central Bank Independence 
                                                      
3  The weights, individually ranging from 0.2 to 1, are the following: Economic policy: 1; Financial system: 0..2; 
Monetary policy: 1; Foreign exchange policy 0.6; Coordination: 1; Resolution: 0.8; Appointment of Governor: 
1; Term of the Governor: 1; Dismissal of Governor: 1; Government representation: 0.8; Appointment of Board 
Members: 1; Terms of Board Members: 1; Dismissal of Board Members: 1; Credit to the Government: 1; 















































































































TotalThe Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/30 © 2007 Enrico Gisolo  7 
A paradoxical consideration is that, once we consider the ECB-criteria weighted indicator, the 
ranking of Cyprus and, to a larger extent, Turkey decrease, notwithstanding the efforts undertaken by 
these countries to implement the aquis communitaire. 
This result seems surprising, as these two countries have been considered complying with the EU 
criteria. The reason behind the difference is of methodological nature and concerns the political 
criteria, or “personal independence” in the ECB terminology, in several aspects: 
•  Concerning the term of office of the Governor and the Board, the ECB criteria establish a 
minimum term of office of 5 years as acceptable, whether for Guitérrez (2003) the benchmark is 
established through the comparison of the term with that of the appointing body (it should be 
longer).  
•  Concerning the competent authority to appoint the Governor and Board members, the ECB 
criteria do not establish who such authority should be, while according to Gutiérrez (2003) it 
should not be the Executive alone or the Executive must not have a predominant role. 
As a result, Turkey and Cyprus can be in full compliance with these ECB criteria and at the same 
time do not reach so satisfactory results according to the Gutiérrez methodology.  














































































































Source: our calculations 
On the other hand, if we consider the three countries for which one both have the Cuckierman, 
Webb and Neyapti (CWN) indicator, updated to 2001, and the score developed in the present study (in 
the following S), namely Cyprus, Malta and Israel, the weighted version of the latter seems, apart from 
a scale factor, to present more similarity with the former (see fig. 3). Enrico Gisolo 
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Fig. 3 – Comparison between CWN and S (Cyprus, Malta and Israel) 
(Absolute values) 
Source: our calculations 
In the remainder of this paragraph, the results of the assessment for each dimension of evaluation 
are presented and briefly commented (for details on the methodology applied, see Appendix 2). 
As already mentioned, differently from fig. 1 and 2 , this further section of the paper presents the 
scores in terms of difference from the respective average, to emphasize the comparative dimension of 
the analysis.  
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  Box 1: Central Bank Independence in Israel 
The degree of actual independence that the central bank of Israel enjoys is higher than what the law 
would suggest. A suitable measure of central bank independence is the weighted index used in 
Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN, 1992).  The index features a normalised average of 16 
characteristics ranging from 0 (lower independence) to 1 (highest independence).  More recently, 
Cuckierman analysed the degree of actual independence enjoyed by the Bank of Israel year by year, as 
well as the legal score in the original charter of 1954, after the relevant amendment of 1985 and after 
the implementation of the modifications proposed in 1988 by the Levin Committee (Chart 3). The 
Committee was composed of independent experts appointed by the Israeli Prime Minister in 1987 to 
issue recommendations aimed to align the central bank statute to the best international practice. The 
Committee recommended, among other things, that price stability be set as the overriding goal for 
monetary policy. 
Chart 3: Israel – Legal vs. Actual Independence 
Source: Our calculations based on data from Cuckierman 
The issue of the independence of the central bank of Israel also came to the attention of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), which was requested to evaluate an amendment proposed by the 
Ministry of Finance (Draft Bank of Israel Law, amendment No. 20, 5762-2002), in the context of the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Israel. The ECB assessment stated that the Bank of Israel 
Law and the amendment proposed would have been basically inconsistent with the EU Treaty and the 
ESCB Statute. Also the IMF, in its 2004 Article IV Consultation, highlighted the need to amend the 
law to “reflect international best practice regarding monetary policy objectives and procedures, along 
the lines of the recommendations of the Levin Committee”. 
In 2005, after years of unsuccessful attempts, a proposed new Bank of Israel law was finally 
drafted by the government. Parliamentary approval is still pending and is expected shortly after the 
elections. Key principles of the proposed new law include the creation of a monetary committee 
responsible for interest rate decisions; the formation of a management board responsible for oversight 
of administrative matters and the establishment of price stability as a primary policy objective. The 
proposed law should finally reconcile de facto and de jure central bank independence and fulfil the 
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Fig. 4 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Objectives 

































































































Source: our calculations 
Central bank objectives – This dimension of the evaluation analyses the situation concerning 
economic policy and the financial system. As for economic policy, it is very near to the ECB 
definition of independence (that basically coincide with the fact that price stability is the overriding 
goal for monetary policy). The component relative to the financial system is based on the rationale that 
when the law attributes to an independent authority the supervision of the financial intermediaries, the 
autonomy of the central bank as regards the conduct of monetary policy is higher, because the 
monetary authority is not committed to different goals, potentially conflicting. Accordingly, the 
countries that recently joined the European Union (Malta, and Cyprus) as well as the candidate 
country of the area, Turkey, present the higher degree of autonomy, together with a Maghreb country, 
Tunisia, while all the other countries show an unsatisfactory independence as regards the 
determination of the objectives of monetary policy (fig. 4). This is also the ranking in total terms, since 
the second objective does not really discriminate among countries, with the notable exception of Lebanon.  
The second  aspect, the financial system, analyses if supervision is explicitly delegated to an 
autonomous agency, granting a better mark if this is the case. Nonetheless, it is not universally 
accepted that the fact that supervision is separated from the Central Bank is necessary for 
independence or better on effectiveness grounds
4. Indeed, the ECB criteria on independence refers to 
this issue in the financial independence provisions, to state that the decisions made by supervisory 
authorities within the CB but through an independent decision-making the central bank should not 
endanger the finances of the Central as a whole.  
 
                                                      
4   See, for example, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1999). “Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?”. The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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Fig. 5 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Policy Formulation 





































































































Source: our calculations 
In fact in the present study this criteria does not tell us much, since all countries are ranked equally, 
because most of them are in charge of supervision themselves, or do not make a reference to the issue. 
The exception is Lebanon, who has established an independent Banking Control Commission. I 
considered this Commission could not be regarded as an “autonomous government agency” since its 
budget must be ratified by the Higher Banking Council, whose chairman is the Central Bank governor, 
and thus this conditioned financing could interfere with the conduct of its functions.  
This is the reason why in total terms, Lebanon is around the average, but when adopting the 
“weighted criteria” according to the ECB independence assessment this exception diminishes in 
importance. 
Policy formulation – Apart from the fact that long run price stability should be regarded as the 
prominent objective for monetary policy, an important component of central bank independence is the 
capacity to formulate concrete policies independently from the government. From this perspective, this 
criteria analyses the situation regarding monetary policy, foreign exchange policy, coordination in the 
establishment of policies and resolution of conflicts.  
On global terms, Cyprus and Turkey show a satisfactory independence level, while Malta is 
slightly below the average, even if joining the European Union is likely to further insulate the 
implementation of monetary policy from excessive governmental pressures. Algeria and Jordan show 
as well a comparatively high degree of independence in policy formulation, while the legislation of the 
other countries seems to be more binding on this issue (see fig. 5). Palestine gets here a surprisingly 
high mark, but this fact is explained by a good law which sets clearly the Palestine Monetary 
Authority (PMA) responsibility in the conduct of the monetary and exchange rate policy, which is 
obviously not matched by reality; the PMA does not issue its own currency, so obviously we are 
referring here to a merely legal and not de facto autonomy.  
Concerning the specific objective of Monetary Policy, there are subtle differences in the wording 
used by each Central Bank Law which hide differences in the degree of power of the Central Bank: the 
ranking goes from “outline” the monetary policy (Lebanon), to “shape” it (Israel), to “give its opinion” 
(Morocco).  Enrico Gisolo 
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Political autonomy – Political autonomy is the dimension that in this study presents the more ample 
range of scores, also due to the fact that it is the sum of two components: one relative to the position of 
the governor, the other one to the position of the other members of the board (figs. 6 and 7). 
Fig. 6 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Political Autonomy (Governor) 
































































































Term of the Governor




Source: our calculations  
  
Fig. 7 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Political Autonomy (Board) 




























































































2.00 Appointment of Board Members
Terms of Board Members 
Disimissal of Board Members
Total
 
Source: our calculations 
As shown in previous fig. 1 and 2, the political autonomy is the only dimension that is globally 
negative for all countries, with the only notably exception of Algeria. The case of Algeria, The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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nonetheless, could be nuanced taking into consideration that the fact that there is not a reference in the 
law to the term of office of the governor and vice-governors, and no reference to the grounds for 
dismissal plays in favour of Algeria because of the scores applied; I have evaluated these aspects with 
a “0”, which mean that there is no legal reference in the law, while most other countries have negative 
scores on these issues. Nonetheless, since the articles mentioning the fixed term of office for the 
Governor and vice-governors were expressly deleted from the law in a reform that took place in 2001, 
we could consider here that the deletion in fact grants powers to the Executive to freely dismiss the 
governor and Board members at any time, and that their term is shorter or equal to that of the 
Executive, so the assessment when taking into consideration the legal background should be negative.  
At the same time, EU members and the candidate country do not rank very high in this aspect, 
which reflects the methodological difference between the ECB criteria and the Gutiérrez ones 
concerning the term of office of the governor and Board of Governors and their appointments.  
Israel has not been included in Fig. 7 since it is the only Central Bank in the region which does not 
have a Board of Governors, nor a Monetary Policy Committee. 
As stressed before, legal indices of central bank independence are often incomplete and noisy 
indicators as laws are not able to specify explicitly the distributions of powers between the central 
banks and the political authorities under all contingencies (and, even when the laws are quite explicit, 
actual practices may deviate from them). Cuckierman (1992), for example, argues that legal 
independence measures may be a better proxy of effective independence in industrial countries than in 
emerging market economies. Thus, as an alternative, Cuckierman (1992) and Cuckierman et al. (1992) 
used as a proxy of (actual) central bank political independence in the ‘80s the actual average term of 
office of the governor, assuming that, at least above some threshold, the longer this term is, the higher 
is the independence of the central bank from politicians. Following this line of thinking, de Haan and 
Sturm (2001) built an extensive data set of the turnover rate (TOR)
5 of governors for 90 emerging 
market economies during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Fig 8 plots a TOR-based indicator (TORav,- TORn), namely the difference between the average 
TOR in the Mediterranean region and the TOR in each of the 12 Mediterranean countries considered 
in this study, as well as in the 90 emerging economies as a whole. By construction, positive values of 
this index correspond to higher political independence and vice versa. Besides the values for the entire 
period considered by de Haan and Sturm (2001), values for the two sub-periods 1980-1989 and 1990-
1998 are also reported. Countries are ordered, in ascendant order, following the value of the respective 
TOR-based indicator for the period 1980-1998. It is clear from fig. 8 that the overall figures for the 
Mediterranean region are better, in terms of central bank independence, compared to the whole sample 
of emerging economies (only Libya and Turkey show average figures worse than the average of the 90 
emerging countries). While most of the countries have experienced an improvement of the degree of 
independence of the central bank from politics (that has been important in countries such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel and Tunisia), for Jordan, Malta and Syria, the opposite holds. 
                                                      
5   This variable is equal to the average number of changes of governors per year, or , in other words, to the 
reciprocal of the average term of appointment) Enrico Gisolo 
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Fig. 8 – Turnover Rate Of Governors (1980-1998) 
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Source: our calculations on data reported in de Haan and Sturm (2001)  
Furthermore, the TOR can be helpful to evaluate if there is a correlation between the indicator of 
legal political independence shown in figs. 6 and 7 and a measure of the actual degree of political 
independence, than can be proxied by the TOR-based indicator. Fig. 9 plots the dismissal of governor 
component of the political independence indicator, as well as the TOR-based 1980-96 indicator.  
 





















































































Source: our calculations  The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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It is worth noting that the countries considered can be clearly split in two sub samples: Algeria, 
Morocco, Cyprus, Lebanon and Malta present a positive correlation between the turn over of the 
governor and the relative legal provisions, while the other countries show a negative correlation. In 
particular Libya, Jordan, Tunisia and Israel show a turnover rate of governor comparatively higher that 
the one that would have been implied by the legal framework, while the opposite holds for Turkey and Egypt. 
Economic autonomy – As regards the economic autonomy attributed by law (which basically 
coincide with the owning of a dedicated capital, the independence of judgment in financing the 
government and the possibility to freely operate on the capital markets by the central banks) the 
Mediterranean sample is nearly equally spit in two sub-samples. Lebanon, Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Egypt and Cyprus seem to enjoy the highest level of economic independence, while Jordan, Libya, 
Malta, and, to a larger extent, Morocco and Israel present a level of legal economic independent below 
the average (fig. 10). Nonetheless, the situation in Morocco in this regard is about to change according 
to the new law which is being elaborated. 
Fig. 10 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Economic Autonomy 





































































































Source: our calculations  
Lebanon ranks first here because it is the only country that states that the Central Bank cannot 
operate with non-financial institutions (quasi-fiscal activities)  and also establishes clear limits to the 
credit to government, which is only allowed in extraordinary circumstances and subject to safeguards.  
Accountability – According to the index used in the present work, the majority of central banks 
present a satisfactory (above average) level of accountability, intended in terms of publication of 
statements and audit procedures. The EU member countries, together with Turkey, rank first in this 
criteria. Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria and Libya appear to be, on the contrary, scarcely 
accountable. 
 Enrico Gisolo 
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Fig. 11 – Legal Central Bank Independence: Accountability 































































































Source: our calculations  
4. The Macroeconomic Impact of Central Bank Independence 
The previous part of this paper reports the results of an extensive analysis of the charter of the central 
banks of the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea and thus give a picture of the degree of central 
bank legal independence in the area. Nevertheless, as stated above, legal independence does not 
necessarily imply actual independence, at least in the short run. To assess preliminary to which extent 
legal independence may correspond to actual a correlation analysis of the calculated independence 
indicator and the average inflation in the past ten years may prove to be useful. The result of such an 
analysis are reported in fig. 12 that plots the independence indicator and the last ten years average 
inflation rate
6.   
As mentioned, the central bank of Israel enjoys a degree of actual independence higher than the one 
suggested by the legal indicators. Bearing in mind this consideration, fig. 12 clearly shows how 
amongst the central banks of countries of the Barcelona Process for which data are both reliable and 
comparable, we can identify a group of 5 which shows the expected correlation between the legal 
independence indicator and the inflation fighting attitude (Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Malta and Tunisia), 
two central banks whose actual anti-inflation behaviour seems greater that the one implied by the legal 
indicator (Jordan and, even more, Morocco). On the contrary, Algeria exhibits a higher-than-expected 
middle-run inflation rate when compared to the legal independence enjoyed by its central bank. 
                                                      
6   Data are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund. Due to 
non-availability or very poor quality of the data reported for inflation and GDP growth in the last available 
version of the IFS,  Palestine,  Lebanon and Libya have been excluded from the present analysis. Turkey has 
bee excluded as well because available data, although reliable, show an iperinflation pattern, not common to 
the area, that only very recently seems to have come to an end. The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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Fig. 12 - Legal Independence vs. Recorded Inflation 
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Note: data are expressed in differences from the average. Source: elaboration on IFS data (IMF).  
To the extent in which the middle-run inflation rate can be considered a rough indicator for the 
degree of conservativeness (inflation-fighting commitment) of a central bank, fig. 12 can help 
identifying which are the more conservative monetary authorities of the area with regard to the legal 
framework in which they operate. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn comparing the legal independence indicators with a measure of 
the medium term excess money growth (EMG), defined as the last ten year average difference 
between the growth rate of quasi-money and the one of GDP (as in fig. 13). EMG is highly correlated 
with inflation, as arguable, except for Morocco and Jordan where a relatively high EMG has led to a 
relatively low inflation. This may imply a different interpretation of the behaviour of the local central 
banks: they may have actually pursued an expansionary monetary policy that has only partially 
translated on prices due to some deflationary pressures. In other words, they may have not been as 
conservative as the analysis of medium term inflation could suggest. Enrico Gisolo 
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Fig. 13 - Independence Indicator and Conservativeness 















































































Source: our elaboration on data from IFS of the IMF.   
Notwithstanding the fact that the economic theory does not present any conclusive argument in favour 
of the view that inflation, at least within common recorded values, may lower growth, there is a quite 
widespread consensus on that fact that when inflation is under control, the market's uncertainties are 
reduced, the price formation mechanisms is thus more effective and,  as a consequence (provided that 
the market mechanism are working) the resulting better allocation of resources (through price 
adjustments) should foster long-run growth. The evidence from the last ten years in the countries 
considered does not contradict the common understanding (fig. 14). In fact, if we exclude Algeria, 
where prolonged episodes of civil war during the last decade have reduced mid-term growth rates, a 
trade-off seems to exist between the ten years average inflation rate and the same-period growth rate. 
A relevant exception seem to be represented by Egypt, at least if we do not consider the high devaluation of 
the currency occurred in 2003, which contributed to the vigorous recent raise of inflation. 
The available data suggest that a strong commitment in reducing inflation seem to be conductive to 
a better long term macroeconomic performance: except from Malta, where a relative low inflation 
seems not to have implied a faster growth, the expected relation between long run inflation and growth 
seem to be verified in the majority of the countries considered. 
 The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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Fig. 14 - Inflation vs. Growth 
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Note: data are expressed in differences from the average Source: elaboration on IFS data (IMF). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Central bank independence, as resulting from the provisions of law, has been analyzed, also in its 
relation with the overall macroeconomic performance by a number of studies. Notwithstanding 
arguments against that, there is a broad consensus on the fact that central bank independence should 
positively reflect (at least in industrialized countries) on fighting inflation attitude, and thus foster 
growth. The nexus between de jure central bank independence and its possible macroeconomic 
implications have been far less explored for emerging economies, even if some recent attempts have 
contributed to shed some light on this also in developing areas, including Latin America, Baltic and 
the CIS Republics, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, an assessment of central bank 
independence for the countries of the Barcelona Process had not been conducted so far. The present 
work represents a first investigation of the situation in this area. From a country-side point of view, the 
present study shows that very few laws succeed in reaching a balanced equilibrium between all the 
aspects of independence. Indeed, even the countries that have a positive assessment and that usually 
rank among the firsts for all criteria, such as Cyprus and Malta, show noticeable exceptions; for 
example, Cyprus ranks number 9 in the case of the Political Autonomy-Governor, and Malta ranks 
number 10 in the Economic Autonomy. The same could be said as regards Tunisia, which ranks 
always number 2 or 3 except for two important exceptions in which it is nearly the last country in the Enrico Gisolo 
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list: Policy Formulation (number 11) and Accountability (last one, number 12). Lebanon could be 
considered an average country, with two exceptions: it is the last one in the assessment of the Political 
Autonomy of the Governor, and the first one in the Economic Autonomy. The same could be said 
about the Palestine Monetary Authority, with exceptions; it ranks first concerning Policy Formulation. 
At the lower rank in the sample, we find Egypt, Jordan, Libya and Morocco.  
The main achievements of the assessment of the degree of central bank independence seem to be 
the following: 
1.  Looking at the legal independence situation, as stated in the central bank laws, the 
Mediterranean countries show a diverse picture, sometimes counterintuitive if compared to 
the common wisdom; 
2.  Looking at one possible but rough indicator of actual independence, as well as taking into 
consideration the deeply studied case of Israel, legal independence does not always appear 
in line with the de facto situation; 
3.  The Mediterranean countries that recently joined the European Union (Cyprus and Malta) 
and Turkey, that has been recognized a candidate country status, do not always show the 
best degrees of legal or actual independence, even when the indicator proposed by this 
study is adjusted to match the Treaty compliance criteria; 
4.  Central Bank independence is a “hot” issue for the region; many central banks of the area 
have recently amended their Statutes with a view to achieving more independence.  
A preliminary analysis on the impact of central bank independence on macroeconomic variables 
can lead to the following conclusions: 
1.  The legal independence indicators proposed by this study seem to adequately capture the 
effective degree of independence and appear also to be to some extent correlated to the 
conservativeness of each central bank; 
2.  Pursuing a low inflation rate appears to be a suitable policy indication for the countries of 
the Barcelona Process also having in mind possible positive repercussions on long term 
growth; 
3.  Even if the reaction functions of the central bank of the area may have indeed been similar, 
the pass through to prices (and the effects on growth) of monetary policy actions may have 
followed country specific paths. This fact points out to the need of tailor adequately 
monetary policy to each single country situation while pursuing an inflation fighting 
objective. 
Further research is needed to better understand in which extent the actual situation is coherent with 
the legal picture, even if this effort presents non trivial challenges, mainly due to lack of detailed 
information on internal procedures and unofficial agreements and relationships. An immediate fields 
for further research on the central bank profession attitude in the Mediterranean region could be a 
better assessment of other features of the central banks of the area (e.g. the degree or 
‘conservativeness’ or, in other words, of the inflation-fighting commitment) and, consequently, a more 
in-depth exploration of the relationship between the features of the single central banks and the 
respective country specific macroeconomic developments. The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks 
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